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ARE FAMILY FIRMS REALLY MORE SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE? 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper conducts an empirical study as to whether family firms are more socially responsible 
than their non-family counterparts, and explores the conditions in which this difference in social 
behavior occurs. We argue that family firms, given their socioemotional wealth bias, have a 
positive effect on social dimensions linked to external stakeholders, yet have a negative impact 
on internal social dimensions. Thus, family firms can be socially responsible and irresponsible at 
the same time. We also suggest that institutional and organizational conditions act as catalysts in 
the relationship between firm type and CSR. General support for our thesis that family firms 
neglect internal social dimensions came from the study of a sample of 598 listed European firms 
over a period of 4 years. Moreover, while national standards and industry conditions influence 
the degree of CSR in non-family firms, these factors do not affect family firms. However, family 
firms’ social activities are more sensitive to declining organizational performance.  
 
    3
 
INTRODUCTION 
 During the last few decades, family business literature has extensively studied how family 
firms make strategic choices that are consistently different from those made by non-family firms 
[see Gomez Mejia, Cruz, Berrone & De Castro (2011) for a recent review]. Among the many 
issues addressed by family scholars, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has received 
increasing attention. However, despite the efforts to disentangle the role of the family dimension 
in the adoption of social initiatives (i.e., actions that appear to further the social good, beyond the 
interest of the firm (McWilliams &Siegel, 2001: 117), there is a lack of agreement about whether 
family firms are more or less socially responsible. 
 While some scholars have argued that family firms are more prone to proactively engaging in 
social activities because, by doing so, they preserve and enhance their non-financial preferences 
and socioemotional wealth (SEW) (Cennamo, Berrone, Cruz & Gomez Mejia, 2012), others have 
advocated that family firms may not be more socially responsible. Amoral familism (Banfield, 
1958), distrust of outsiders (Fukuyama, 1995), and the “dark side” of SEW (Kellermanns, 
Eddleston & Zellweger, 2012) make family members more concerned with their own interests 
than those of others, thus negatively affecting social actions (Morck & Yeung, 2004). Evidence 
also seems to be mixed and contradictory. For instance, Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia & Larraza-
Kintana (2010) showed that controlling families adopt environment-friendly strategies more 
frequently than non-family firms in polluting industries. Dyer & Whetten (2006) found no 
significant differences between family and non-family firms, with regard to positive social 
initiatives, but discovered that family firms were more concerned with avoiding social concerns. 
Interestingly, Bingham, Dyer, Smith & Adams (2011) show exactly the opposite.   
 There are various possible reasons behind these contradictory views and evidence. Firstly, 
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though with some exceptions (i.e., Bingham et al., 2011), most research dealing with the link 
between family firms and CSR has focused almost exclusively on a single dimension of 
companies’ social actions, namely the environment, whilst when several dimensions have been 
considered, they have been treated in a preliminary way (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). Secondly, and 
perhaps more importantly, these works also focused on a single dimension of family SEW, 
namely the family’s concern with its image and reputation. This provides an incomplete picture 
of the uniqueness of family firms (Berrone, Cruz & Gomez Mejia, 2012). Lastly, previous 
studies have largely neglected the role of contextual factors that amplify or mute the relationship 
between firm type and social actions.  
 We address the above gaps in the literature by arguing that because family firms are 
concerned with their image and reputation as a way to protecting their SEW, they are likely to be 
more responsive to external stakeholders’ demands (more specifically, the environment, the 
community, and their customers) than non-family firms. However, their concern with control and 
influence within the company and their strong emotional attachment to it (another two key SEW 
dimensions) are likely to deter social actions related to internal stakeholders (namely, employees 
and governance). Moreover, we explore how institutional and organizational conditions affect 
the link between family ownership and CSR. Specifically, we argue that national differences in 
economic, cultural and social terms, industry, and declining organizational performance, have a 
different impact on the degree of CSR in family and non-family firms. We tested our theoretical 
tenets on family and non-family controlled companies in 22 European countries during a period 
of 4 years, using a unique and original collection of data.  
 This study contributes to the literature in several ways. Firstly, we reconcile the seemingly 
contradictory views about the role of family firms in terms of CSR. We argue and show that 
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family firms can be socially responsible (vis-à-vis external stakeholders) and socially 
irresponsible (vis-à-vis internal stakeholders) at the same time, suggesting that family firms can 
simultaneously “be good and bad”. In doing so, we expand stakeholder theory by providing fine-
grained arguments and more evidence about the role of diverse principals in enacting varying 
responses to stakeholder pressures. Our analysis of the moderating factors between ownership 
and CSR also contributes in this direction. Unlike prior works, we take into account 
organizational and institutional moderators in the relationship between family firms and CSR 
outcomes. We argue and show that in responding to stakeholder claims, family owners act 
differently, not only depending on the type of stakeholders (internal versus external), but also 
depending on whether pressures to implement social practices come from institutional or 
organizational factors. Finally, studying firms from different countries enables national 
differences to be taken into account, an issue which has been neglected in almost all family 
studies up until now (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is considered as an overarching construct that 
encompasses the set of business policies and practices reflecting corporate responsibility for 
some of the wider societal good (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Yet, the precise manifestation 
and direction of these social practices are left to the discretion of the corporation, largely affected 
by who owns the company, and dependent on the varying owners’ preferences (Berrone, et al., 
2010; Walls, Berrone & Phan, 2012). Concerns over legitimacy influence firms by pushing them 
to adopt certain managerial practices that are expected to be socially valued by stakeholders 
(Deephouse, 1999). However, given the conflicting voices amongst different stakeholders, it is 
    6
not clear how firms give priority to the diverse social claims made by these stakeholder groups 
based on their degree of salience and importance (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). 
 The confusion is highly visible in the case of family firms. The stakeholder view considers the 
family as an internal stakeholder because it is linked to the company through ownership, 
employment, or family ties (Mitchell, Agle, Chrisman & Spence, 2011). Initial studies ignored 
family interaction with external stakeholders assuming that family owners were shielded from 
outside pressures because of their strong ownership position. New research has challenged this 
view, finding that family firms are also responsive to the claims of external stakeholders 
(Berrone, et al., 2010; Bingham et al 2011). However, understanding how families give priority 
to internal and external stakeholder claims is an unresolved issue (Mitchell et al., 2011).  
 To fill this void, we propose a combined framework drawing on organizational identity 
theory, the socio-emotional wealth approach and stakeholder theory. Organizational identity 
refers to elements that are central, unique and enduring about an organization (Scott & Lane, 
2000). When applied to the reasons why social practices are adopted, organizational identity 
predicts that firms are more likely to engage in social actions if, in doing so, these reinforce their 
self-professed desires. By helping the firm to define what it needs to look at, organizational 
identity also explains how firms prioritize different stakeholder claims (Brickson, 2007).  
 Scholars agree that the preservation of the non-financial aspects or “affective endowments” of 
family owners, what Gomez-Mejia et al. (2007) refer to as “socioemotional wealth” (SEW), is 
the most salient aspect of family firm identity. Proponents of the SEW view suggest that family 
owners are more likely to engage in social practices even when there is no clear evidence that 
this engagement implies economic rewards, because there is socioemotional reward for the 
family (Berrone et al., 2012).  
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 Implicit in this claim is the assumption that SEW is a monolithic concept, a unique reference 
point that guides family owners’ strategic decisions. Moreover, it is also assumed that responses 
will be homogeneous regardless of the type of stakeholders, their proximity or the form of 
legitimacy they grant. We challenge these assumptions by drawing on recent studies that suggest 
that SEW has different dimensions, which can explain the existence of different reference points 
among family principals (Berrone, et al., 2012; Cennamo, et al., 2012), associated with positive 
or negative valence (Kellermanns, et al., 2012). We argue that, when deciding about social 
actions, family owners are concerned with protecting their SEW. Still, given the 
multidimensional nature of SEW, and the existence of multiple claims from diverse stakeholders, 
response to this concern may elicit varied answers from family owners. As argued below, this 
implies that family firms can “be good and bad” at the same time, in terms of social practices. 
 
Family and non-family firms, and responses to internal and external stakeholders 
 Extant research suggests that, as family firms are concerned with corporate reputation, they 
should be particularly inclined to satisfy the demands of internal stakeholders (i.e. those that are 
directly related to the company through ownership or employment) by pursuing responsible work 
practices (Zellweger, Nason, Nordqvist, & Brush, 2011). However, with some exceptions (e.g., 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2005), family business literature is full of examples that show exactly 
the opposite. Family ownership is often associated with the design of unfair compensation 
systems (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009), use of lower peer appraisal processes (Fiegener, 
Brown, Prince, & File, 1994), managerial entrenchment (Gomez-Mejia, Nuñez-Nickel, & 
Gutierrez, 2001), nepotism (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003), scapegoating of non-family 
executives and employees (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-Kintana & Makri, 2003), and gender 
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discrimination (Jimenez, 2009). Implicitly, the bulk of evidence shows the existence of two 
distinct types of internal stakeholders (family vs. non-family) in family firms, who are treated 
differently when it comes to social practices.  
 The “emotional attachment” dimension of SEW can explain this differential treatment. Due to 
the type of social links family members have with their firms, family companies become the 
place where their needs for affection and belonging are satisfied (Berrone et al., 2012). This 
results in family altruism (Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Although family altruism is 
generally reputed to temper self-interest inside the family business (Chrisman, Chua & Litz, 
2004), it also has a negative side. Specifically, the presence of altruism fosters a set of 
interdependent relationships among family members that differentiates them from people outside 
the family (Chrisman, Chua & Bergiel, 2009). Thus, the presence of family altruism can cause 
inconsistencies in the application of organizational rules depending on whether the employee is a 
family or non-family member.  
 Another important dimension of family SEW that also leads to asymmetric treatment of 
employees (family vs. non-family) lies in the family owners’ desire to keep full control over the 
organization. Some authors suggest that this is the most salient factor affecting family company 
behavior (Chrisman, Chua, Pearson & Barnett, 2012). The SEW approach predicts that, in order 
to preserve SEW, family owners need to control the firm on a permanent basis (Berrone, et al., 
2012). Hence, they engage in strategies that empower them to retain and/or extend their power 
over the firm’s operations. Employing family members, even though they are not qualified (Chua 
et al., 2009), or decoupling family members’ compensation from performance outcomes (Cruz, 
Gomez-Mejia & Becerra, 2010) are examples of strategies directed at preserving the “family 
control and influence” dimension of SEW. This asymmetry is contrary to the existence of social 
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practices toward employees that imply fair treatment of the workforce and equal opportunities 
for all of them. The “emotional attachment” and the “family control and influence” dimension of 
SEW also explain family owners’ responses to internal stakeholder claims related to governance. 
When a family owns a large portion of shares, family owners are likely to see governance 
structures as a tool to reinforce their control and to force top executives to pursue the family’s 
objectives (Kellermans et al., 2012). In this case, instead of using corporate governance 
mechanisms to legitimize the firm, the family uses them to reinforce family control in the 
company and protect other family members (Jones, Makri & Gomez-Mejia, 2008), adopting 
mechanisms which go against good governance practices. Evidence supports this view. Family 
firms are known to have less independent directors (Anderson & Reeb, 2004), be more likely to 
have CEO duality  (Voordeckers, Van Gils & Van den Heuvel, 2007), and make fewer 
disclosures of their corporate governance practices in their proxy statements (Ali, Chen & 
Radhakrishnan, 2007).  
Therefore, although literature points to the implementation of social practices related to 
internal stakeholders as essential to bringing legitimacy to firms (Mayo, Gomez-Mejia, Berrone, 
Firfiray, & Villena, 2012), we argue that this “legitimacy-seeking logic” operates differently in 
the case of family businesses. If engaging in proactive stakeholder management with internal 
stakeholders jeopardizes family control and exposes family members to higher risks compared to 
non-family firms, family businesses will be more reluctant to implement social practices related 
to internal stakeholders. Formally stated, this leads us to posit the following statement:  
H1a: Family firms are less likely to adopt social practices related to internal stakeholders (i.e., 
employees and governance) than non-family firms. 
 A different picture emerges when it comes to responding to external stakeholder demands. In 
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this case, the family owners’ main concerns are to protect and enhance the family image and 
reputation, which is another important dimension of SEW (Berrone et al., 2012). As opposed to 
internal stakeholders, external stakeholders are not seen as a direct threat to the family’s 
emotional attachment or influence over the company. Nevertheless, they can be powerful 
elements in affecting a company’s reputation and image (Berrone, Gelabert, Fosfuri & Gomez-
Mejia, 2013).  
 Family members are sensitive about the external image they project to external stakeholders 
(Craig & Dibrell, 2006). This is because the identity of the family owner is so closely tied to the 
organization that external stakeholders perceive the firm as an extension of the family itself. In 
many cases, the family even connects its name and reputation to the product it sells (Birghman et 
al., 2012). Consequently, family firms are expected to be more willing to endorse any social 
practice that improves their image and legitimacy in the outside world (Cennamo, et al., 2012). 
At the same time, the SEW approach argues that since family owners are not faceless owners, 
they are far more exposed to losses of SEW, as a result of socially irresponsible behavior, than 
anonymous investors (Berrone, et al., 2010). Thus, they avoid engaging in any actions that may 
lead external parties to stigmatize them as irresponsible corporate citizens (Deephouse & 
Jaskiewicz, 2013). Thus, we propose:  
Hypothesis 1b. Family firms are more likely to adopt social practices related to external 
stakeholders (i.e., the environment, and the community) than non-family firms. 
Institutional and organizational factors as moderators of the relationship between 
ownership and CSR 
 By building on the multidimensional nature of SEW, the framework developed so far has 
argued that, when compared to non-family owners,  family owners respond differently to internal 
    11
and external stakeholders, when it comes to social actions. In this section, we also contend that 
given the SEW preservation concern that characterizes family owners, the determinants of CSR 
decisions in terms of both internal and external stakeholders may differ in family and non-family 
firms1. Based on different disciplines that have supported the notion that “country matters” and 
that geographic and competitive environments have an enduring inﬂuence on organizations 
(Marquis & Battilana, 2009), we first examine the effect of national and industry references on 
both family and non-family firms, when they make CSR decisions. We also analyze the effect of 
declining firm performance” since this is a key variable in understanding decisions pertaining to 
CSR activities (Roberts, 1992), and it is shown to have an impact on family owners’ SEW 
preservation goals (Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007).  
 
 Institutional factors: national CSR standards and industry conditions, and their effect on 
social activities 
 Strategic conformity refers to the extent to which a firm’s behavior adheres to central 
tendencies and industry norms, and emphasizes the isomorphic processes that underlie 
conforming behaviors (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). When applied to CSR, research 
suggests that, when deciding on social initiatives, firms often adopt similar “best practices” to 
avoid experimentation (and the associated risks of it), and secure an appropriate response that 
will grant expected legitimacy (Jennings & Zandbergen, 1995). Indeed, some would argue that 
external forces have transformed CSR “from heresy to dogma” for modern corporations (Lim & 
                                                 
1 Given that the arguments presented in this section apply to both internal and external stakeholders, and for the sake 
of parsimony, we have not made a distinction between different types of stakeholders. Nonetheless, empirical 
analyses do reflect this difference. 
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Tsutsui, 2012). Literature also shows that the reference that firms use to benchmark their 
practices is influenced by national and cultural boundaries (Campbell, Eden & Miller, 2012), and 
by the characteristics of the industry in which the company operates  (Surroca, Tribo & Wadock, 
2010). Therefore, firms are expected to follow national and industrial references when deciding 
on their CSR activities.  
 When it comes to social practices, one country that actively sets national standards for CSR, 
and is often used as a role model, is the United States (USA). Academic evidence points to the 
USA as a pioneer in incorporating CSR to the business agenda (Kolk, 2000). Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that firms located in a country that is closer in economic, social, 
geographical, and cultural terms to the USA, are more likely to observe social practices and 
perceive greater pressures to engage in social activities than firms located in countries further 
away from the USA. This is particularly true for public-traded companies who are subject to the 
scrutiny of global stakeholders. Hence, the distance of a country with respect to the USA can be 
considered an indicator of national CSR practice standards.  
 Companies are also likely to conform to industry practices (Matten & Moon, 2008) in Europe, 
a community in which CSR initiatives are largely driven by industry associations, Indeed, a 
recent European study (Zollo et al., 2011) observed that the industry in which a firm operates is 
one of the key external factors that determines the degree of cognitive alignment between 
managers and stakeholders in terms of CSR activities. More specifically, they indicate that high 
technology industries are among the sectors with the highest alignment (narrowest gaps), which 
results in them being more willing to engage in social practices. In line with this argument, 
Surroca, Tribo & Wadock (2010) suggested that in high-growth industries, such as the high-tech 
sector, firms are more likely to engage in social practices because in doing so, they obtain greater 
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reputational benefits than firms competing in more mature sectors. The reasoning is that in a high 
technology sector, a firm’s business and reputation tend to be built in one area, while in more 
mature industries, they are spread over several domains. As a result, firms in technological 
sectors benefit more from the implementation of social practices, in terms of achieving social 
legitimacy Additionally, these gains are crucial to accessing key resources for younger, and 
growing companies (Zott & Huy, 2007), a scenario which is common in high technology sectors.   
 Despite its contribution to understanding CSR, this “legitimacy-seeking” perspective 
overemphasizes the blanket role of institutional forces and neglects the role of principals in 
shaping firms’ response to institutional pressures in the form of conforming or non-conforming 
behavior. Based on a SEW approach, we argue that pressure to conform to these two CSR 
catalysts, i.e. national CSR standards and industry conditions, is lower for family firms. Firstly, 
as the family is the dominant shareholder, family business managers have greater power to act 
unilaterally than their non-family business counterparts (Carney, 2005). Moreover, the use of an 
idiosyncratic reference point (SEW) to guide strategic decision-making is likely to imply 
different logic in assessing the benefits and costs of implementing social practices and, above all, 
diverse and peculiar interests in driving the decision to respond to stakeholder claims. The 
combination of the two arguments, family owners’ discretion to behave idiosyncratically, and the 
pursuit of unique family goals, also suggests that family firms’ strategic responses are likely to 
be more heterogeneous than those of non-family firms (Chrisman & Patel, 2012). As a result, 
family firms’ behavior has greater variations in terms of social practices.  
 The above arguments suggest that non-family firms, which are driven by goals that are mainly 
financial in nature, offer similar responses to stakeholder claims, and are thus more likely to 
follow national and industry references as a way to gaining social legitimacy and securing key 
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resources. Specifically, externally and internally oriented social practices increase when non-
family firms are located in countries that are closer to the USA in economic, social, 
geographical, and cultural terms, and for non-family firm operating in high technology 
industries. The influence of national CSR standards and industry conditions is weaker for family 
firms. Powerful family owners tend to tailor their responses to stakeholder pressures in order to 
meet their SEW protection target instead of implementing off-the-shelf solutions, even when 
these solutions have been accepted as standard. Formally stated, we posit the following:  
Hypothesis 2a. Compared to non-family firms, the social practices of family firms are less 
likely to be influenced by national CSR standards (i.e., distance with respect to the USA) 
Hypothesis 2b: Compared to non-family firms, the social practices of family firms are less 
likely to be influenced by industry conditions (i.e., technological intensity of the sector) 
 Organizational factors: Declining performance and social activities  
 Literature on CSR indicates that the financial return on social practices is, at least in the short 
term, questionable from an economic viewpoint (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). When firms 
experience a decline in performance that may even put firm survival at stake, it may be advisable 
for them to focus scarce resources on core activities with more certain returns (Starbuck & 
Hedberg, 1977). March & Shapira (1992) argued that under declining performance, firms tend to 
shift their attention from aspirations to survival, emphasizing the dangers rather than the gains, 
which, in turn, results in more conservative behavior. Thus, when performance diminishes, firms 
may respond by limiting their engagement in social practices.  
 We expect this tendency to reduce social activities as firm performance declines to be greater 
for family firms. One of the characteristics of owner families is the concentration of a large 
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amount of their personal wealth in a single business (Faccio & Lang, 2002). This concentration 
allows them to control the firm, feeding SEW, but also links their financial and socio-emotional 
capital to the destiny of the business. In the extreme, the family loses everything if the firm does 
not survive. As Chrisman & Patel (2012) states, “as performance weakens, family firms are 
expected to frame decisions more negatively than non-family firms …, owing to the prospect of 
both economic losses and losses of socioemotional wealth.” (p.980). Therefore, the decisions 
made by family firms are more sensitive to declining performance than non-family firms. 
 We expect this greater sensitivity to business decline in family firms to be reflected in the  
CSR arena as well, leading family firms to limit their social activities more than their non-family 
counterparts. When performance declines, controlling families not only tend to pay more 
attention to survival (March & Shapira, 1992), but also use control as the key reference point to 
gauge SEW (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007). That is, families shift their attention from other 
potential SEW reference points, such as image or legitimacy to control, because the increasing 
threat to their firm’s survival is also a threat to the family’s undiversified wealth, and may put 
their capacity to manage the firm under question. Following the logic of the arguments presented 
in Hypothesis 1a, this emphasis on the control dimension of SEW will further deter families from 
investing in internally oriented CSR practices. In addition, as reflected in Hypothesis 1b, 
externally oriented CSR activities are expected to be fuelled by the family’s interest in protecting 
their image and legitimacy. If families turn their attention to control when performance declines, 
this will translate into fewer externally oriented CSR activities. Consequently, we expect that:  
Hypothesis 3. Compared to non-family firms, family firms are more likely to reduce social 
practices in the face of declining performance.  
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METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
We used the universe of publicly-held companies in Europe whose market capitalization 
was over €50 million.2 To be included in our sample, a firm had had to be listed for the whole 
2001-2010 period. This prevented any potential bias associated with recent entrants. Following 
previous studies, we excluded companies from the finance sector. This initial process resulted in 
1,617 companies. This figure was reduced to 598 after matching companies with available data 
on social practices. 
 We used several sources to collect data for our research, such as the CSRHub database, the 
world’s largest corporate social responsibility (CSR) database providing social, environmental, 
community, and governance ratings on around 7,000 companies from 135 industries in 91 
countries. It is also the first database that combines data from five of the leading socially 
responsible investment (SRI) analysis firms (also known as Environment, Social, Governance-
ESG), and over 120 influential NGOs. Thus, the data are relatively objective, and are not based 
solely on self-reported measures. Therefore, they are less likely to suffer from social desirability 
biases. While not as widely used in management as the KLD database, the CSRHub has recently 
been used in the context of social responsibility, both in academic (Bu, Wagner, & Yu, 2013) 
and practitioner environments (Gidawani, 2013). Lastly, like KLD, it includes employee and 
governance performance indicators, so its categorization of social practices fits with the 
                                                 
2 We had to inspect each company´s annual report on an individual basis to determine its family/non-family status. 
Thus, we decided to set €50M market capitalization as a cut-off point to limit the search to reasonable limits. Further 
analyses showed that about 10% of European companies have a market capitalization below €70 million. Thus, our 
cut-off point did not reduce the representativeness of the sample.  
    17
distinction we have made between internal and external socially oriented practices.3  
 We used the “ultimate owner” criteria from the ORBIS (Bureau Van Dyck) database to 
identify companies in which there was an owner or group of owners who held at least 20% of the 
shares. Then, we manually inspected the annual and governance reports of each company to 
obtain the percentage of family ownership in any of the sampled years and the influence of the 
family in the management and governance of the company. Based on previous studies (Gomez-
Mejia et al., 2003), we classified the company as a family firm if two criteria were met: a) an 
individual or a family group owned at least 20% of the shares during the whole period 2001-
2010. In line with Villalonga & Amit (2006), we took members with the highest percentage of 
shares as the focal family and b) at least one member of the family was on the board of directors. 
Following this process, we ended up with 107 family firms and 491 non-family firms. Thus, our 
final panel consisted of 598 European listed firms, 18% of which were classed as family firms. 
Accounting and market data were drawn from the BLOOMBERG database, whilst the remaining 
data on the characteristics of the firm (country, industry, and age) were taken from the ORBIS 
database. Data to construct the CAGE Index were generously provided by Pankaj Ghemawat 
(www.ghemawat.com).  
We collected data on CSR from 2008 (the first year in which CSRHub data were available) 
to 2012 (last year available). In order to guarantee time causality, ownership and financial 
information for a given year was matched with the average CSRHub rates of the two subsequent 
years. For example, financial and ownership information for 2007 was matched with the average 
                                                 
3 More information about CSRHub rates is provided in the subsection describing the dependent variable of the study 
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CSRHub rates for 2008 and 2009. We ended up with four blocks of matched data that constituted 
an unbalanced four-year panel. 
Dependent Variable: Social Practices  
CSRHub is an independent organization (www.csrhub.org) that provides information on 
social practices in over 7,000 companies from 135 industries in 91 countries. The CSRHub 
methodology maps each element of data it receives from a data source into one or more 
subcategories and converts it a to a numeric scale from 0 to 100 (100 = positive rating). 
Subsequently, it compares the scores from different data sources for the same company and 
adjust all the scores from a source to remove bias and create a more consistent rating. It finally 
aggregates these ratings to category level. Five main categories became apparent, two related to 
internal stakeholders (employees and governance), and three related to external stakeholders (the 
environment, the community and customers).  
Internal stakeholders 
The Governance category covers the disclosure of policies and procedures, board 
independence and diversity, executive compensation, attention to stakeholder concerns, and 
evaluation of a company’s culture of ethical leadership and compliance.  
The Employees category includes disclosure of policies, programs, and performance in 
diversity, labor relations and labor rights, compensation, benefits, including those that engage 
employees and improve worker development, and employee training, health and safety. The 
latter covers workplace policies and programs that boost employee morale, workplace 
productivity, company policies and practices to engage employees, and worker development. 
The evaluation focuses on the quality of policies and programs, compliance with national laws 
and with internationally recognized worker rights, as well as proactive management initiatives. 
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External stakeholders 
Environment category data covers a company’s interactions with the environment at large, 
including use of natural resources, and company impact on the Earth’s ecosystems. The category 
evaluates corporate environmental performance, compliance with environmental regulations and 
many other environmental initiatives, such as the mitigation of a company's environmental 
footprint, leadership in addressing climate change through appropriate policies and strategies, 
energy-efficient operations, and the development of renewable energy, and other alternative 
environmental technologies.  
The Community category covers the company’s commitment and effectiveness within the 
local, national and global community in which it does business. It reflects a company’s 
citizenship, its charitable-giving programs, and volunteerism.  
The Customers category covers the responsibility of a company for the development, design, 
and management of its products and services, and their impacts on customers and society at 
large. This reflects a company’s capacity to reduce environmental costs, create new market 
opportunities through new sustainable technologies or processes, and produce or market goods 
and services that enhance the health and quality of life for consumers. It also relates to product 
safety, quality, and the company’s response to problems with safety and quality. 
 
Independent Variables 
In order to test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we included a dummy variable (family) that took the 
value of 1 when the firm was controlled by a family and 0 if it wasn't. This coding was based on 
the methodology mentioned above, to identify firms under family control.  
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To test Hypothesis 2a, we proxied national CSR standards in terms of the cultural, economic 
and social distance from the USA, a benchmark country in social activities. We labelled this 
variable “national standard distance”. The distance between countries is a valid instrument to 
approach the national standards for a given country, because distance measures provide metrics 
to gauge the similarity or differences between the cultural, economic and social characteristics of 
nations (e.g. Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2010). Then, if a country is identified that may be deemed to 
have high standards for CSR activities, the distance from that country indicates how close the 
standards of the focus country are compared to those of the benchmark country. In our case, we 
selected the USA as the reference country. As previously argued, the USA is often used as a role 
model for social practices. In addition to its visibility in the social standards arena, it is outside 
the sample universe (i.e., Europe).  
We followed previous studies that considered distance as a construct with multiple 
dimensions that captures different types of distances between countries (Campbell, et al., 2012). 
In our case, we used Ghemawat’s (2001) CAGE index, where CAGE represents Cultural, 
Administrative, Geographic and Economic distances. Compared to traditional cultural measures 
used in previous studies (Hofstede, 1980), the CAGE measurement suggests that countries can 
be ranked according to administrative, geographic and economic features, as well as cultural 
aspects. In our case, we considered the CAGE index between the European country the company 
belonged to and the USA, for each company in the final sample.  
Regarding the influence of industry (Hypothesis 2b), we relied on international standards to 
divide firms in two groups, according to the technological intensity of their industrial sector. We 
created a dummy variable (HT sector) that took a value of 1 when the company belonged to a 
high technology sector and 0 when it did not. 
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Lastly, declining performance (Hypothesis 3) was measured as the natural logarithm of 
the firm’s ROA ratio at year t-1 to firm performance at year t. To avoid problems with the log 
transformation of negative returns, we added 1 to all original ROA values before calculating the 
logarithm. The declining performance variable took a negative value when firm performance at 
year t was above firm performance in the previous year, zero when it remained the same, and a 
positive value when the company’s ROA declined. Hence, this variable increases as firm 
performance declines.  
 
Control Variables 
We included several control variables to control for other potential determinants of company 
CSR. We first controlled for firm size, since larger firms are subject to closer scrutiny by the 
public from media, special interests, and stakeholders than their smaller counterparts (Rindova, 
Pollock & Hayward, 2006), thereby raising the likelihood of them acting in more socially 
responsible ways (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Companies’ total assets were used to approach 
firm size. To correct for skewness in multivariate analyses, we included the logarithm 
transformation of these total assets. We also controlled for firm age, in terms of the number of 
years since the firm’s creation and used the logarithm transformation in a multivariate analysis. 
We considered two additional variables to capture the potential effect that market forces may 
have on a firm’s social behavior. The first one was Tobin’s Q, to account for a firm’s growth 
opportunities (Dyer & Whetten, 2006). We measured this as the market capitalization ratio plus 
the book value of debt, as a percentage of a firm’s total assets (Chung & Pruitt, 1994). The 
second measure was volatility, calculated as the standard deviation of the company’s stock 
returns. Finally, since high debt costs may limit the firm’s access to the resources needed to 
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develop CSR activities, we included Cost of debt, measured as the financial interest expenses as 
a percentage of financial debt. 
Estimation Methods 
We used random-effect panel data to estimate the influence of family control on CSR. 
According to the Breusch-Pagan Lagrangian Multiplier test, a random-effect model is more 
suitable than a fixed-effect model. Moreover, due to the time-invariant nature of the family firm 
dummy, a fixed-effect model cannot be estimated without dropping the family business variable 
(Dyer & Whetten, 2006). To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we considered the full sample of family 
and non-family firms, and looked at the estimation of the family dummy. For the rest of the 
hypotheses, we ran separate panel data models in the subsample of family and non-family firms. 
The split sample method is appropriate when theory predicts independent-dependent variables 
relations by subgroups (family vs. non-family) and has been extensively used in previous family 
business studies (Gomez-Mejia et al 2003; Berrone et al., 2010).  
 
RESULTS 
The descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in this study are reported in 
Table 1. Results show a high correlation between the five different dimensions of CSR and 
negative correlations between the five dimensions of CSR and the family firm dummy. It also 
shows that although all four correlations are negative, those between the family dummy and the 
externally oriented dimensions of CSR (i.e., the environment, the community and customers) are 
weaker. Nonetheless, it should be taken into account that such negative correlations may be 
capturing a size effect, since larger firms seem to invest more in social activities (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990), and it has been argued that family firm preferences for SEW protection may 
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have a negative impact on their size (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2007). Multivariate analyses are 
necessary to provide a more qualified test of Hypotheses 1a and 1b. 
The national CSR standard measure, approached in terms of the distance between the country 
the firm belongs to and the USA, correlated negatively with the five CSR dimensions. This 
suggests that, as expected, the more dissimilar the country is to the USA, the weaker the social 
performance of firms. This aligns with the notion that the existence of standards, norms, and 
ultimately, pressures towards the adoption of certain practices in a given country, increases the 
number of firms that adhere to such practices and standards.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Table 2 summarizes the results of the panel data models to determine the effect of family 
firms on the hypothesized four dimensions. There is a negative, and highly significant effect of 
the family on the two internal dimensions (i.e., governance and employees) that provides strong 
support for Hypothesis 1a. However, the impact of this dummy on the three external dimensions 
of CSR, namely the environment, the community and customers, was non-significant. Therefore, 
there was no significant difference between the externally oriented social activity of family and 
non-family firms, resulting in Hypothesis 1b not being supported.4 
------------------------------- 
                                                 
4 We reran the analysis using the continuous “family ownership” variable, which measures the percentage of shares 
owned by the focal family in each of the sampled years.  The measure has been the most common proxy used to 
capture the intensity of SEW in prior studies and has been validated in many articles in top journals (e.g., Berrone et 
al. 2010; Gomez-Mejia 2007; Gomez-Mejia, et al. 2011). As expected, the family ownership variable had a negative 
and significant effect on social initiatives related to internal stakeholders. Its effect on external practices was also 
insignificant as was the case when using the dummy variable. Thus, our conclusions remain unchanged. 
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Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b and 3 we estimated two separate models, one for the subsample of 
family firms, and another for the subsample of non-family firms. Table 3 summarizes the results 
of this estimation process. The variable national standard distance was, with the exception of the 
customer dimension, highly significant, and with the expected sign, in the subsample of non-
family firms. However, it was only significant for the governance dimension in the subsample of 
family firms. This provides support for Hypothesis 2a. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 The effect of industry conditions, represented in our analyses by the technological intensity of 
the sector in which the firm operates, was also non-significant for family firms but was positive 
and highly significant, with the exception of the community dimension, for non-family firms. 
This indicates that while non-family firms’ social activity is greater in technologically intense 
sectors, family firms show similar social behavior irrespective of the industry and its 
characteristics. This provides support for Hypothesis 2b. 
 Finally, we also found differences between the two subsamples in terms of the influence of 
declining performance on firms’ CSR policy. More specifically, and as predicted, the influence 
of the variable that captured firm performance evolution on CSR dimensions was negative in the 
family firm subsample. However, this negative effect was only significant for the environment 
and customer dimensions, and was not significant for governance, employees or the community. 
Interestingly, the influence of this variable on the non-family firm subsample was positive and 
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significant for the governance dimension. This indicates a different reaction, in terms of social 
activities, to declining performance between family and non-family firms. While family firms 
tend to reduce their social activity, particularly in external dimensions, non-family firms tend to 
increase activities in the internal governance dimension. These findings support Hypothesis 3. 
We ran additional analyses to test the endogenous nature of the family firm variable in our 
sample, one of which was a pooled regression, for each of the four CSR dimensions, with 
instrumental variables using robust standard errors that took into account the clustered nature of 
the panel data set. In addition, we ran a treatment regression that considered individual 
clustering. The results demonstrate there was no endogeneity bias in our panel data estimations.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 Our theoretical and empirical analyses provide new ways of understanding the role of 
ownership structures in the adoption of practices to respond to different stakeholder demands, 
and thus provide several academic and practical contributions.  
 
Contributions to research 
 While prior literature in the area has studied the role of family ownership and CSR, there has 
been debate about how this influences social practices. The distinction between internal and 
external stakeholders, and the acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of SEW, sheds 
light and helps reconcile contrasting positions. Our work shows that family firms can spur social 
initiatives and be as socially responsible as non-family firms, when they are linked to external 
stakeholders (as a way to protect their reputation and image, and thus increase their SEW). At the 
same time, they abate social practices when they are oriented towards internal stakeholders (as a 
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way to secure control and emotional bonds, and enhance their SEW). Thus, SEW can be a 
“double-edged sword” eliciting both socially responsible and irresponsible behavior in family 
firms, having both a bright and a dark side. The negative effect of the family firm on the 
employee dimension of CSR seems surprising in light of the numerous studies suggesting that 
family businesses tend to manifest a deep sense of personal responsibility towards their 
employees (e.g., Le Breton-Miller & Miller, 2006). Our proposed framework also reconciles 
these apparently contradictory findings. We show that families are reluctant to attend employees’ 
claims regarding social practices, if they have the potential to challenge family control over the 
business or put family employees at risk. Thus, although family owners may be aware of the 
instrumental value of social behavior in terms of internal stakeholders, the need to guarantee 
family control over company operations leads them to neglect this, and they become short-
sighted in this respect. 
 The lack of support for the hypothesis predicting the positive effect of family ownership on 
social activities aimed at external stakeholders also merits some discussion, in light of 
accumulated findings that demonstrate that family control induces CSR activities. While we 
failed to find support for hypothesis 1b, results indicate that when it comes to external 
stakeholders, family firms are not significantly different from non-family firms. We interpret this 
as a balancing process in which family firms engage, acting in socially responsible terms towards 
external stakeholders (at least to an extent which is comparable with non-family firms) while 
behaving less responsibly towards internal stakeholders. Moreover, the fact that our results do 
not confirm previous evidence showing that family firms engage more actively in initiatives 
aimed at external stakeholders, such as the environment (Berrone et al., 2010), can be explained 
in the national contexts in which our research was conducted (European countries). Differences 
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with respect to prior work can be explained, at least partially, as a consequence of national 
differences. When we considered differences in terms of national standards, this was done with 
respect to the USA as a reference point. However, we believe that issues at regulatory level (e.g., 
specific environmental laws and norms, regulatory stringency and enforcement mechanisms), 
may explain the different results. Future research should investigate to what extent these 
differences interact with the identity of the owners (i.e. family versus non-family), to explain 
cross-national variations in company responses to stakeholder claims.  
 Our work also contributes to the growing literature that frames phenomena under the SEW 
approach. Our evidence, suggesting that the underlying drivers that push social initiatives in both 
ownership forms are significantly different, confirms the uniqueness of family company identity, 
through the use of SEW as a reference point to guide strategic decisions (Berrone, et al., 2012). 
Going further, our results indicate that because family firms use SEW preservation as a reference 
point rather than using far-off targets defined by institutional factors (i.e., national standards or 
industry conditions), they are less likely to “follow the norm” when responding to social claims 
from internal and external stakeholders. However, concern with SEW preservation also implies 
that family firms’ social practices will be more responsive to organizational factors that may 
jeopardize family SEW, and specifically to the evolution of firm performance. As noted, family 
firms tend to reduce their externally oriented social activities when faced with a decline in 
performance. This finding is in line with previous research (Chrisman & Patel, 2012; Gomez-
Mejia, et al., 2007) that shows how the strategic behavior of family firms varies when firm 
survival is perceived to be at stake. Interestingly, the evidence provided shows that non-family 
firms react in a different, and to some extent, unexpected way when they face weakening 
economic performance. Contrary to their family counterparts, our results suggest that non-family 
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firms are more prone to engage in governance-improving activities as performance deteriorates. 
A cynical interpretation of this is that managers of non-family firms use social initiatives in a 
context of decreasing performance as a tool to entrench themselves in the firm (Cespa & 
Cestone, 2009). An alternative explanation may lie in the instrumental approach to stakeholder 
management that suggests that firms use social practices as an instrument to gain legitimacy, 
reputation, and other critical intangible assets to operate in a given context (Hillman & Keim, 
2001).  
 Overall, our results show that family firms do not operate in a vacuum and that institutional 
and organizational factors can affect the way they function and operate. Family firms’ relative 
isolation from external forces and their greater sensitivity to organizational factors has an almost 
homogeneous effect across internal and external CSR dimensions. However, future research 
should examine the specific effect of these factors by stakeholder type. Similarly, additional 
institutional and organizational factors should be included in this analysis.  
 
Contributions to practice  
 Managers who are keen to pursue social actions need to know that their chances of adoption 
are contingent on the firm’s ownership structure. The chances of implementing practices are 
higher in family firms, as long as they are related to external stakeholders. However, if managers 
intend to focus on actions that improve the conditions of internal stakeholders, they will 
encounter resistance in family firms. Paradoxically, family firms see these practices (or the lack 
of them) as a valuable way to preserve their socio-emotional endowments. 
As noted, we have observed that, compared to their non-family counterparts, family firms 
decisions concerning social actions are less influenced by external managerial trends and 
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standards. Such relative isolation may be an advantage for family firms, to the extent that this 
can protect the firm from management practices that are simply fads, and are not driven by 
efficiency considerations. However, there is also a flip side, as family firms may lag behind in 
the adoption of practices that, at least in certain contexts, are deemed to have a positive impact 
on firm results. Family firm managers should be aware of these circumstances and engage 
themselves in the search for truly efficient management practices. 
 
Limitations  
Our work has its limitations. At least four aspects must be highlighted. Firstly, we did not 
measure SEW directly, but instead proxied it by using a dummy that considers both family 
ownership, and a family member on the board of directors. Although this is not perfect, we 
believe it is a valid initial approach for a SEW construct, for several reasons. Family ownership 
has been the most common proxy used to capture the intensity of SEW in prior studies and many 
articles in top journals have validated it (Berrone et al. 2010; Gomez-Mejia et al., 2007; Gomez-
Mejia, el al. 2011). Moreover, as the concentration of company ownership in family hands 
increases, the family has greater influence over the firm’s strategic decisions (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003; Miller et al., 2010), reinforcing the control dimension of SEW, the level of personal 
attachment and identification, and the emotional bonds between family members and the firm 
(French & Rosenstein, 1984). In addition, as Berrone et al. (2012) argued, the percentage of 
shares owned by a family is “perhaps the only available alternative when using large archival 
databases” (p. 264). Additionally, controlling family influence over company affairs increases 
with the presence of at least one member on the board of directors (Anderson et al., 2003). 
Nonetheless, future research should try to measure SEW and its link to CSR directly.  
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Secondly, our distance variable considered the USA as our reference point. We noted the 
use of country distances, as proxies for the relative presence of high standards for CSR, demands 
the selection of a reference country with high CSR standards. This limitation should be kept in 
mind when implementing this approach. We also ran our analyses taking a European country, the 
United Kingdom, as a reference. Results (available on request) are very similar to those obtained 
when the USA was used as our benchmark. However, we consider that future research should 
explore the availability of alternative measures to capture national CSR standards. 
Thirdly, our empirical setting only took in publicly traded firms. Subsequent studies should 
explore these relations in privately-owned companies. While it is widely agreed that publicly 
held companies are more exposed to institutional pressures, further studies should examine how 
family control issues and emotional bonds interact with CSR outcomes in the case of private 
family firms. Moreover, private family firms are likely to use less formal internal and external 
practices.  In fact, as we see it, the formality of social practices in the case of listed firms can be a 
valid response to an important stakeholder: the shareholders. Future studies should address what 
happens to the relationship between family influence and CSR in contexts in which this formality 
is not required, as is the case of privately-owned firms. 
Moreover, although including firms that were listed for the entire 2001-2010 period avoided 
the effect of new entrants, it does not completely rule out the presence of survivor bias. 
Nonetheless, we explored this issue by looking at the firms excluded from our sample. Evidence 
indicated that they were not included, in most cases, as a result of missing data, or because the 
firm stopped trading as public concerns. Only a handful of them went bankrupt. We interpret this 
as evidence that survival bias was not a concern in our sample.  
 
    31
  
Concluding Remark 
This study reveals that the SEW protection concern that characterizes family firms leads them to 
show a double face in their relationships with stakeholders. While they are as responsible as non-
family firms in their relationships with external stakeholders, they show a more restrictive 
behavior with internal ones. Such behavior is less influenced by external norms and standards, 
but is more sensitive to performance decline.  
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 Mean S.D. Governance Employees Environment Community Customers  
 
Family National Std.  
distance 
Governance 53.48 9.85 1              
Employees 56.30 9.49 0.755 *** 1            
Environment 54.54 10.45 0.714 *** 0.726 *** 1          
Community 51.39 9.19 0.735 *** 0.760 *** 0.753 *** 1        
Customers 49.84 11.35 0.549 *** 0.520 *** 0.682 *** 0.535 *** 1      
Family firm 0.17 0.374 -0.189 *** -0.172 *** -0.095 *** -0.130 *** -0.017  1    
National std. 
distance 
3.76 2.05 -0.266 *** -0.243 *** -0.048 * -0.208 *** 0.045  0.189 *** 1  
HT sector 0.39 0.49 0.002  0.018  0.021  -0.041  0.175 *** 0.027  0.129 *** 
Declining.P. 0.06 1.23 -0.009  0.011  0.000  -0.013  0.007  -0.007  -0.003  
Volatility 0.36 0.21 0.004  -0.043  -0.059 * -0.046  -0.026  -0.015  -0.065 ** 
Firm size 8.31 1.73 0.296 *** 0.252 *** 0.376 *** 0.263 *** 0.341 *** -0.002  0.268 *** 
Firm age 3.75 0.92 -0.067 ** -0.063 ** -0.005  -0.036  0.083 *** 0.153 *** 0.197 *** 
Tobin’s Q 1.53 0.83 -0.093 *** -0.051 * -0.096 *** -0.055 * -0.049 * 0.024  -0.054 * 
Cost of debt 7.95 9.45 -0.012  -0.013  -0.029  -0.018  -0.037  -0.019  -0.015  
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 
 
 HT sector Declining P. Volatility Firm size Firm age Tobin’s Q Debt 
HT sector 1              
Declining P. 0.036  1            
Volatility -0.002  -0.081 *** 1          
Firm size -0.057 * 0.006  -0.190 *** 1        
Firm age 0.060 ** 0.002  -0.007  0.102 *** 1      
Tobin’s Q 0.150 *** 0.054 * -0.192 *** -0.323 *** -0.088 *** 1    
Cost of debt -0.020  0.005  -0.007  -0.043  -0.025  0.025  1  
 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 2. Panel data estimations for the influence of family firms on CSR 
 Governance Employees Environment Community Customers 
Family firm -3.150 *** -2.430 *** -1.026  -1.894  -0.374  
National std. distance -1.500 *** -1.400 *** -0.657 *** -1.049 *** -0.318  
HT sector 1.515 * 1.546 *** 1.386 * 0.140  4.471 *** 
Declining P. 0.191 * -0.134  -0.050  0.069  -0.272 * 
Volatility 7.461 *** 2.561 *** 5.554 *** 5.685 *** 7.384 *** 
Firm size 2.331 *** 2.021 *** 2.531 *** 1.822 *** 2.412 *** 
Firm age -0.218  -0.027  0.136  -0.252  1.063 * 
Tobin’s Q -0.338  -0.189  -0.711 * -0.350 * -1.268 ** 
Cost of debt -0.001  -0.001  -0.004  -0.011  0.002  
N 1771  1755  1741  1580  1518  
Wald X2 282.00 *** 215.56 *** 211.28 *** 131.31 *** 199.24 *** 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 3. Panel data estimations on the determinants of CSR in family (FF) and non-family (NFF) firms. 
 Governance Employees Environment 
 FF  NFF  FF  NFF  FF  NFF  
             
National std. distance -0.848  -1.567 *** -0.328  -1.539 *** -0.431  -0.691 *** 
HT sector -2.130  2.110 *** -1.603  2.008 *** -1.781  1.889 ** 
Declining P. -0.176  0.206 * -0.762  -0.108  -1.718 *** 0.015  
             
Volatility 8.538 ** 7.485 *** 6.411 * 2.230 * 4.050  5.931 *** 
Firm size 2.055 *** 2.368 *** 1.279 ** 2.135 *** 1.610 * 2.625 *** 
Firm age 0.023  -0.191  -0.255  0.086  1.652  0.027  
Tobin’s Q -0.904  -0.216  -0.831  -0.060  -1.567  -0.611  
Cost of debt 1.001  -0.001  0.019  -0.001  0.034  -0.004  
             
N 290  1471  288  1467  286  1553  
Wald X2 41.41 *** 249.80 *** 25.90 ** 193.77 *** 37.50 *** 139.39 *** 
             
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
    41 
 
Table 3. Panel data estimations on the determinants of CSR in family (FF) and non-family (NFF) firms (cont.). 
 Community Customers  
 FF  NFF  FF  NFF  
         
National std. distance -0.785  -1.092 *** -0.3432  -0.334  
HT sector -2.761  0.657  -1.323  5.463 *** 
Declining P. -1.049  0.113  -1.250 * -0.236 * 
         
Volatility 7.996 ** 5.647 *** 11.399 ** 7.048 *** 
Firm size 1.130  1.918 *** 1.671  2.439 *** 
Firm age 0.191  -0.241  3.273 * 0.880  
Tobin’s Q -1.812 ** -0.077  -1.739  -1.312 ** 
Cost of debt 0.895  -0.011 * -0.160  0.002  
         
N 253  1327  239  1279  
Wald X2 30.60 *** 109.87 *** 33.51 *** 177.49 *** 
         
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
